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Abstract 
This article charts the development of a label that appeared early on in Australian 
debates on climate change, namely ‘greenhouse sceptics’. We explore who uses the 
label, for what purposes and with which effects, and how this label may contribute to 
the development of social representations in the climate debate. Our findings show that 
over the last 25 years ‘greenhouse sceptic’ has been used by journalists and climate 
scientists to negativise those criticising mainstream climate science, but that it has also 
been used, even embraced, by Australian climate sceptics to label themselves in order to 
construct a positive identity modelled on celebrity sceptics in the US. We found that the 
label was grounded in religious metaphors that frame mainstream science as a 
catastrophist and alarmist religious cult. Overall, this article provides detailed insights 
into the genealogy of climate scepticism in a particular cultural and historical context. 
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Embracing and Resisting Climate Identities in the Australian Press: Sceptics, Scientists 
and Politics 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Social scientists (e.g. Jaspal et al, 2013) have studied climate scepticism – doubting aspects 
of a generally accepted body of climate scientific research, with some examining how 
scepticism has emerged and developed over time (Weart, 2010), while others focus on labels 
used in reference to people who accept or doubt the existing science (Howarth & Sharman, 
2015). By ‘labels’ we mean words and phrases applied to groups/individuals who take a 
particular stance on climate change. There has so far been no systematic investigation of how 
labels have emerged and changed over time and how they may contribute to the development 
of social representations of climate change. 
In this article, we investigate how labels are used in relation to ‘climate scepticism’ in 
the Australian press, focussing on the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’. Surveying the rise and fall 
of several labels, we found the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ was among the first used to 
describe critics of mainstream climate science (figure 1), and that this label was mainly used 
in Australia.1  
 
Insert figure 1 here 
 
The Australian political and media landscape deserves scrutiny, as climate scepticism has 
rarely been studied in this context. Australia makes one of the highest per capita contributions 
to emissions, and is vulnerable to climate change impacts (Burgmann & Baer, 2012). Here, 																																																								
1 Fluctuations in labels overall will be explored in a different study. 
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we explore how the ‘greenhouse sceptic’ label is used in the press and the potential effects of 
its use for debates on climate science and politics. Specifically, we ask: How did actors 
writing media articles or quoted in the papers employ this label (to label themselves or 
others) and thus establish types of identities? For what social, political and rhetorical 
purposes (to make a scientific point, a political point, and so on) are labels employed and how 
does this shape the climate change debate in Australia? Drawing upon Social Representations 
Theory, we examine these questions through a thematic analysis of a small corpus of 
Australian newspaper articles. 
 
Australia: climate change politics and the media 
Climate change has been described as one of the most politicised scientific issues and this has 
clearly been the case in Australia. Australia’s two major political parties, The Australian 
Labor Party and the Liberal Party of Australia, both have performed poorly in response to 
climate change (Talberg, et al, 2013). Following the Australian Academy of Science’s 1976 
acknowledgement of anthropogenic climate change, the power of the fossil fuel industries 
escalated and began to counteract the theory (Burgmann & Baer, 2012). When Australia 
adopted the 1988 Toronto Target, which aimed for a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2005, legislators included the proviso that reductions should not threaten the 
economy. The label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ was initially coined in the US in 19892 but was now 
used in the Australian press for the first time (figure 2). The label is a metaphorical 
compound which can be unpacked as: somebody who doubts the increased greenhouse effect 
leading to global warming. The compound ‘greenhouse effect’ itself stands for ‘enhanced 
greenhouse effect’. While the earth would be inhabitable without the natural greenhouse 
effect, the enhanced greenhouse effect might lead to dangerous global warming (Australian 
																																																								
2 The Associated Press (1989) 
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Academy of Sciences, 2013). As a metaphor for global warming, the ‘greenhouse effect’ has 
a history reaching back to the 1800s (Nerlich & Hellsten, 2014).  
 
Insert figure 2 here 
 
Under the Keating Labor Government, Australia signed the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), and Keating established the National Greenhouse Response 
Strategy (NGRS), including a voluntary scheme to encourage industry to reduce emissions. 
At Kyoto in 1997, Liberal Environment Minister, Senator Robert Hill, secured a controversial 
concession which allowed Australia to increase its emissions by 8%.3 During this debate we 
see the second spike in the use of the label. Along with the US, Liberal Prime Minister 
Howard refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Compliance with carbon reduction targets was 
framed in Australian politics as economically detrimental (Kurz et al., 2010). Howard’s 
governments were closely allied to the ‘carbon lobby’ representing fossil fuel interests who 
had unparalleled influence over Australian climate policies (Pearse, 2007). His government 
“worked diligently to control public debate” over the greenhouse effect by denying its 
existence, sidelining climate research (Hamilton, 2007, p.13). 
By 2006, when we see the third spike in coverage, climate change was in the top five 
issues of concern to Australian voters (Pearse, 2007). The previous year had been the hottest 
on record; a prolonged drought and dwindling water supplies led to water restrictions being 
imposed on urban populations. In 2006 Al Gore visited Australia to promote his documentary 
An Inconvenient Truth, and the British Government released the Stern Review, both receiving 
widespread coverage in the Australian media. 
 Prime Minister Abbott’s electoral success in September 2013, which he labelled as “a 
referendum on the carbon tax” (Gurney, 2014) brought about further changes in climate 																																																								
3 http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/the-australia-clause-bites-back-20091023-hda9.html. 
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chance policy. Abbott sought to undermine the climate science underpinning the legislation, 
by establishing “a sense that Australia was on the edge of disaster, carried there by cheats, 
fakes, crooks and incompetent liars” (Chubb, 2014, p.65). Once elected, Abbott quickly 
repealed the Clean Energy Act, and abolished the Climate Commission supported by the 
newly elected Palmer United Party.4 
 Australia’s political stance on climate change has been characterised by engagement 
and disengagement, due to the perceived impact of carbon reduction for the economy, 
diverging political ideologies and political opportunism. The vicissitudes of Australia’s 
political engagement are mirrored in print media in debates around climate change 
(scepticism). 
 
Climate change (scepticism) in the media 
The print media constitute an important source of societal information regarding climate 
change and can at least set the tone for socio-political engagement with societal issues, by 
influencing and reflecting policy agendas (Reese et al., 2003). Media-generated controversies 
may lead to increased scepticism (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004). Moreover, for researchers the 
print media are the only source for achieving a historical understanding of the use of climate 
sceptic labels before blogs and twitter became commonplace.  
Studies have only recently begun to focus on climate scepticism in the mainstream 
media (Painter & Ashe, 2012). This is in a context in which scientific knowledge about 
climate change and its causes has increased substantially and in which climate scientists 
generally agree about what is happening and why, while simultaneously social 
representations about this issue are increasingly fragmented and polarised.  
In a study of Australia’s ten largest newspapers in 2011/2012, Bacon (2013) found 
coverage of climate change in Australia was primarily “framed within a vociferous political 																																																								
4 http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/emissions-reduction-fund 
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debate about climate change policy”, with few stories mentioning climate science (p. 10). 
One third of articles did not accept the scientific consensus of anthropogenic climate change, 
and climate scepticism received favourable coverage. However, there is little detailed 
empirical research into the portrayal of climate change (scepticism) in the Australian media 
(but see Speck, 2010; Burgmann & Baer, 2012; Chubb, 2014), which, in view of the political 
complexity of climate change in that country, is an important lacuna. 
 
‘Greenhouse sceptic’: label and social representation 
In human cognition, labels function as conceptual anchors and stabilize abstract ideas in 
working memory (Clark, 1997). They simplify perception by allowing us to group people 
into categories (under labels), and to sort friend from foe, insiders from outsiders etc. 
(Becker, 1963). Labels are social – they determine one’s patterns of interaction with the 
labelled individual/group. For instance, the label ‘denier’ characterizing an individual 
unconvinced by climate science constructs the individual as knowing but refusing to accept 
the truth. In addition to other-labelling, people may also label, or categorize, themselves 
(Chrysschoou, 2003). Self-labels and how we are labelled by others do not always match, 
which can impede communication and induce intergroup hostility. In our analysis we are 
particularly interested in the social functions of labelling – that is, how self- and other-labels 
create particular patterns of meaning, thinking, and interaction vis-à-vis climate change. 
Theoretically, we draw upon Social Representations Theory (Moscovici, 1988), which 
focuses on collective elaborations of knowledge and how cultural meaning systems evolve. A 
social representation consists of a network of ideas, values and practices in relation to a given 
social object which can facilitate communication about it. A label may be thought of in terms 
of a social representation when it is anchored to, and objectified in terms of, other social 
phenomena. 
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• Anchoring refers to the process of making something unfamiliar understandable by 
linking it to something familiar. For instance, by anchoring climate science to fraud, it 
is construed as something to be mistrusted.  
• Objectification is the process whereby unfamiliar and abstract objects are transformed 
into concrete and ‘objective’ common-sense realities – most notably through the use 
of metaphor – allowing us to map aspects of more familiar knowledge (the so-called 
source domain) onto more unfamiliar knowledge (the so-called target domain) 
(Nerlich, 2010). “The analysis of the relationship between source domain and target 
domain in a metaphor used as an objectification device can help explain how social 
representations are acquired collectively and individually” (Wagner, 1995, p. 671), 
and, we argue, become part of social/group identities. People not only see the world 
but also themselves through metaphors: use of religious metaphors can serve to 
construct climate science as speculative and dogmatic, rather than empirically and 
scientifically grounded. In this case, a pervasive and stable mapping between a source 
and a target domain, namely the ‘conceptual metaphor’ SCIENCE IS RELIGION (Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980), is exploited to frame climate science/scientists in particular ways. 
This conceptual metaphor is the basis for many expressions, such as “the scientific 
orthodoxy of anthropogenic global warming”, “engaging in a witch hunt against 
global warming heretics” etc. Through metaphors we label and comprehend one thing 
in terms of another; this includes ourselves and our identities. 
Labels such as ‘climate sceptic’ or ’scientist’ are not devoid of cultural references. In using 
particular labels in particular social, political and rhetorical contexts, newspaper articles may 
anchor climate change in broader cultural constructs, thereby contributing to social 
representations. Social Representations Theory enables us to emphasise the social dimension 
of labelling by focusing on potential implications of using particular labels in particular ways 
in particular contexts. Moreover, labels (in the sense of self-categories) can be examined 
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through the lens of the theory given that identity itself arguably constitutes a form of social 
representation (Chryssochoou, 2003). 
We present qualitative analyses of a particular label, and emerging social 
representations, used in relation to climate change. We provide a longitudinal analysis of 
three significant temporal points – 1990, 1997 and 2006. Within each year we begin by 
outlining the emerging themes relating to the use of the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ and 
scrutinise the contexts in which the label is used, e.g. whether the label is used positively or 
negatively, for self-description or other-description, to legitimise or delegitimize 
individuals/groups.  
METHOD 
 
Data collection 
Using the news database LexisNexis, we conducted a search of the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ 
used in media coverage of climate scepticism in ‘All English Language News’ on a high 
similarity setting (on July 1, 2014). When originally mapping the use of labels over time, we 
found that ‘greenhouse sceptic’ was the most popular. We found 252 articles mentioning 
‘greenhouse sceptic’, published between 13/10/89 and 23/04/13, of which 209 were 
newspaper articles and the rest newswires, press releases etc. 158 articles were published in 
Australian newspapers. There were three spikes in the Australian print media’s use of 
‘greenhouse sceptic’, in 1990, 1997 and 2006; we focus on coverage in these seminal years. 
In total, our corpus included 50 newspaper articles (table 1). 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
Analytic approach 
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We analysed the corpus using qualitative thematic analysis, “a method for identifying, 
analysing and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.78), 
represented as themes. Here thematic analysis is employed to identify emerging social 
representations of climate scepticism anchored around the term ‘greenhouse sceptic’ and the 
fine-grained linguistic and rhetorical strategies employed.  
We read through the corpus to familiarize ourselves with the broader themes, noting 
initial observations that captured essential qualities, units of meaning and apparent rhetorical 
techniques within the corpora. We discussed our respective initial codes, which included inter 
alia general tone, forms of language (e.g. metaphors), comparisons, categorizations and 
emerging patterns. Potentially idiosyncratic interpretations of the data were discussed until 
consensus was reached. Initial codes were collated into preliminary themes. Final themes 
were arranged into a coherent structure best reflecting the corpora.  
 
ANALYSIS 
 
We analysed press coverage chronologically in 1990, 1997 and 2006. Here, we chart overall 
themes relating to science and policy and the use of greenhouse metaphors and religious 
metaphors in the context of this debate. 
 
1990: Greenhouse sceptics come in from the cold 
In 1990, the first IPCC report was published, which began to generate some debate around 
climate science and politics. These political events appear not to have had a direct impact on 
the use of the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ in the Australian press. Press coverage was instead 
triggered by a newspaper article published in the prestigious US science magazine Science at 
the end of 1989 amid the publication of a book entitled The Climate Trap by an Australian 
sceptic, John Daly, also in 1989. In 1990, there was a discernible attribution of positive 
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characteristics to the label ‘sceptic’, an emerging delineation of ingroup versus outgroup in 
the context of climate change and the crystallisation of climate identities in relation to 
representations of alarmism and uncertainty.  
 
Imbuing the sceptic label with positive characteristics 
An event outside Australia triggered the first use of the label ‘climate sceptic’ in the 
Australian press.5 Malcolm Newell wrote a news item entitled “‘Hot Air’ on greenhouse”, 
reporting on a Science article entitled “Greenhouse skeptic out in the cold.”6 The Science 
piece focused on one of the most prominent climate sceptics, Richard Lindzen, still active 
today, referring to him as an ‘iconoclast’ – a rather heroic label repeated several times and 
amplified in the Australian news article.  
Given Lindzen’s personification of the more general category of climate sceptics, his 
representation as an iconoclast (an individual who destroys images of religious veneration 
and attacks cherished beliefs as based on fallacy or superstition) rhetorically generalised this 
religious metaphor to the whole category ‘sceptics’. This metaphor evokes imagery of an 
individual refusing to conform to fallacy, regardless of its broad acceptance, and who is 
committed to the revelation of truth. Thus, sceptics were implicitly positioned as heroically 
pursuing truth in a world dominated by misconceptions (in turn associated with climate 
scientists). Religious metaphors were employed to construct sceptics as the ‘real’ scientists. 
This positive use of a religious metaphor to label a climate sceptic in turn serves to frame 
environmentalists and climate scientists as a religious cult (Nerlich, 2010). Thus the 
overarching conceptual metaphor SCIENCE IS RELIGION can produce many framings of both 
climate science and scientists, and those who oppose climate science. 
Similarly, the Science article was quoted as claiming that “no other US greenhouse 
sceptic has such scientific stature”, conferring further legitimacy and gravitas to the label and 																																																								
5 The Advertiser (13/01/90) 
6 Science on 1 December 1989 
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the group it represents. Although the Australian news article also referred to Lindzen as “a 
doubting Thomas of the ‘greenhouse’ environmental debate”, it attributed to him the identity 
of a “leading American meteorologist” warning readers not to “dismiss him as another 
crank”. There was a clear delineation of the emerging label climate sceptic and negative 
categories, stereotypes and representations such as “crank”.  
In 1990, several other articles stressed the necessity for Australian scientists, 
politicians and citizens to consider all arguments about climate change with care and balance, 
carving a space for climate sceptics to voice their critique of climate science and in which 
these critiques can plausibly be accepted (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004).  
In this period of coverage, ‘greenhouse sceptic’ was gradually being constructed in 
positive terms, laying the groundwork for its deployment as a self-identity category after 
1990, that is, as a category that positions the individual in the climate change debate and 
communicates their position in relation to it (Chryssochoou, 2003). 
 
Scientists versus sceptics: power, silencing and prejudice  
There was increasing delineation of the sceptics’ ingroup from the climate scientist outgroup. 
For instance, an article7 written by Tom Gosling, a prolific freelance science journalist, uses 
the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ in its headline (“Greenhouse sceptic stirs science congress 
critics”) in reference, for the first time, to an Australian - John Daly. As pointed out above, in 
1989 Daly, a self-taught climate specialist, had published a book entitled The Greenhouse 
Trap: Why the greenhouse effect will not end life on earth (Daly, 1989), in which he 
identified various aspects of mainstream climate science of which he and others were 
sceptical. The book referred to ‘the Armageddon Syndrome’, to scientists as ‘False Prophets’, 
and to ‘the Cult of Experts’8. Consistent with many articles published in this year, the climate 
scientist outgroup was delegitimised through the use of religious metaphors, which 																																																								
7 The Herald (14/02/90) 
8 https://quadrant.org.au/opinion/doomed-planet/2009/11/john-l-daly/). 
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constructed climate science as based on fallacy, ingroup favouritism and even 
psychopathology. 
Controversy arose from the fact that Daly had not been allowed to present a paper at 
the 59th Australian and New Zealand Association for the Advancement of Science (ANZAAS) 
conference in 1990, because, as a “senior CSIRO scientist said, ‘He’s not a scientist’”.9 
Sceptics interpreted this as an act of “gagging”,10 which constructed climate sceptics as the 
“victims” of an injustice perpetrated by climate scientists. Use of this metaphor served to 
represent an undemocratic process of domination led by climate scientists who allegedly 
sought to forward their own agenda and to silence the voice of the climate sceptic 
community. Yet, as a newspaper article11 highlighted, “Mr Daly defended his right to speak 
at the conference saying he didn’t believe it was necessary to have a PhD or work for an 
institution to be called a scientist” – an argument which continues to be deployed by sceptics 
today (Jaspal et al., 2013). Consistent with the representation of climate sceptics as heroically 
championing truth over fallacy, here there is a construction of a prominent climate sceptic 
laying claim to the right to speak openly. 
The charge of false prophecy against mainstream climate scientists was reiterated, 
albeit as a question, in an article12 by Gosling entitled “Throwing stones at the Greenhouse”:  
 
“Is the Greenhouse Effect a false prophecy by scientists who have too much faith in 
their computers. Or is it a sensible warning that something might be going wrong with 
our planet? According to a new band of ‘greenhouse dissenters’, it is a false prophesy 
which carries about as much credibility as tea-leaf reading” and a “load of old 
codswallop, invented by scientists so they can get research grants”.  
																																																								
9 The Herald, 14/02/1990 
10 Sunday Herald, 25/02/90 
11 The Herald, 14/02/1990 
12 The Advertiser (10/03/1990) 
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Climate science was anchored to religion through the use of the metaphors ‘prophecy’ and 
‘faith’ in relation to scientific predictions - the ‘faith’ of scientists was constructed as 
excessive, the ‘prophecy’ as ‘false’. Although the opposing argument: “something might be 
going wrong with our planet” was certainly entertained, this was subordinate to the main 
representation that climate science is religion.  
Furthermore, climate science was anchored to less socially accepted and less plausible 
forms of orthodoxy, namely speculative superstition, through a comparison with “tea-leaf 
reading”. Climate science was constructed as nonsensical and the scientists’ rationale for 
disseminating “codswallop” as financial greed (Jaspal et al., 2013). Against this backdrop, the 
“greenhouse dissenters” were positioned as valiantly leading the struggle for truth. In one 
article,13 Gosling referred to Mr Daly as “Australia’s most vocal greenhouse skeptic” and, in 
another,14 as “Australia’s leading greenhouse sceptic”. In short, the label ‘sceptic’ was 
attributed to others, rather than as a self-label, but was increasingly framed in positive terms. 
In an outspokenly sceptical article15 entitled “Global warmth leaves me cold”, D. 
Hampson referred to Daly as a “marine electronics engineer [who] has studied global 
atmospherics for 20 years”, accentuating his long-standing expertise and justifying Daly’s 
claims to scientific credibility. In view of this positive construal of a climate sceptic, his 
exclusion from ANZAAS was represented as unreasonable: 
 
“Now why should all these well known and no doubt well funded ‘scientists’ want a 
lone Greenhouse sceptic gagged? They couldn’t have something to hide, could they? It 
couldn’t be their own selves, could it, who have been misinforming the community on a 
massive scale.”  
																																																								
13 The Herald (21/02/1990 
14 The Herald (28/03/1990) 
15 The Sunday Herald (25/02/90) 
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This extract exemplifies the construction of a particular pattern of power relations between 
climate scientists and climate sceptics. While the climate scientists were represented as “well 
known” and “well funded” and, thus, powerful, climate sceptics were depicted as “lone” 
actors who were oppressed and, thus, relatively powerless. The label was employed to create 
a positive identity for greenhouse sceptics, as it evoked imagery of the rather heroic ‘lone 
ranger’ battling greed and corruption. Greenhouse sceptics like Daly were portrayed as 
revealing evidence that mainstream scientists try to suppress or keep secret – a trope that 
would become a mainstay of sceptic discourse after ‘climategate’ in 2009 (Nerlich, 2010). 
Mainstream scientists, by contrast, were portrayed as being involved in a ‘scam’, a word that 
rapidly rose to prominence around that period (Nerlich & Koteyko, 2009). Social 
representations are invoked in order to legitimize the emerging ingroup identity and to 
delegitimize the outgroup. 
  
Emerging representations and identities: alarmism and uncertainty 
The emerging climate sceptic identity was based on two major premises, namely (1) the 
argument against what in 1990 is increasingly referred to as alarmism and (2) the emphasis 
upon uncertainty in science in an attempt to delegitimize the ‘alarmist’ predictions of climate 
science. Thus, the primary ethos of the climate sceptic identity was to legitimize the sceptics’ 
own polemic social representations of climate change and to delegitimize hegemonic social 
representations of climate change, disseminated by climate scientists.  
The social representation of mainstream climate science as alarmist, through its 
anchoring to doomsday phenomena, came strongly to the fore in 1990, exemplified by the 
article focussing upon Lindzen’s portrayal in Science.16 The article reported that Lindzen’s 
doubts regarding the greenhouse effect were based on critiquing the “doomsday scenario”, 
																																																								
16 The Advertiser, 13/01/90 
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“doomsday predictions” and the “doomsday view” promulgated by climate scientists. 
Lindzen was also quoted as stressing the many uncertainties surrounding such “predictions”. 
Thus, like other “lone greenhouse sceptics”, he was represented as contesting allegedly 
exaggerated, fear-mongering predictions. Consistent with the observed focus on religious 
metaphors in this period, the characterization of these predictions as doomsday evoked 
religious imagery. 
Conversely, the climate science identity emerged from the reinforcement of the 
hegemonic social representation of anthropogenic climate change. An article17 by Gosling 
quite explicitly argued against the sceptics’ stance:  
 
“the scientists have taken the morally responsible line in informing the community of 
what they believe could be an impending disaster. It is far worse to deny the existence 
of a problem than to perhaps exaggerate it. We have been warned.” 
 
In the extract, the identity of climate scientists was hinged on morality and responsibility - 
positive values (Irwin, 1995). Their principal aim was represented as averting what “could be 
an impending disaster”, rather than greed as hypothesised by some climate sceptics. 
Therefore, the climate scientist identity was constructed in opposition to the polemic social 
representations disseminated by climate sceptics. What was deemed as alarmism by the 
sceptics was re-constructed as a warning based on morality and responsibility. There is, thus, 
a competing not only of identities but also of social representations associated with them.  
The Science/sceptic episode is called metaphorically: “a volley in the greenhouse 
wars”.18 This metaphor of war would run through the next few years during which 
mainstream scientists and greenhouse sceptics struggle over public perception and policy 
impact and over the positive or negative use of the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’.  																																																								
17 Herald, 21/02/1990. 
18 The Advertiser, 13/01/90 
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An article about Daly19 referred to a communication dilemma emerging from a clash 
between mainstream scientists’ and sceptics’ respective social representations. Gosling 
quoted the president of the ANZAAS congress:  
 
“if it turns out in 10 years that the [greenhouse] effect is not severe, scientists will 
probably be dismissed as a ‘bunch of wankers’. But if we said nothing, and it turns out 
that there is very serious global warming, the community will have lost 10 years 
valuable lead time, and we’ll be condemned as being typical reticent scientists. We’re 
damned if we do, and dammed if we don’t’”.20  
 
There was an attempt to safeguard the position of scientists, who faced public scrutiny over 
the uncertainties underpinning climate science, by constructing the ingroup as being in a no 
win situation. An element of victimhood was attributed to the ingroup versus that of the 
sceptics’ outgroup, which is interesting considering the victimhood attributed to the sceptic 
community described above.  
Uncertainty was a pervasive rhetorical tool used in the greenhouse debate of that time 
(Antilla, 2005), but scientists tried to rhetorically decrease its social and political clout in 
delegitimizing climate science.  
 
1997: Greenhouse scepticism gains momentum in Australia 
In 1997 the Kyoto protocol was heavily debated, with the US under Bill Clinton and Al Gore 
promoting it, and Australia under Liberal Prime Minister John Howard sidestepping it. In this 
section, we outline the role of Gelbspan’s 1997 book The Heat Is On in the framing of 
scepticism; how the sceptic label became a positive self-identity label; and the crystallisation 
of conflict between climate science and climate sceptic identities, respectively. 																																																								
19 The Herald (14/02/90) 
20 Herald, 14/02/1990 
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Gelbspan and the framing of greenhouse sceptics 
In early 1997, there was some negative coverage of greenhouse sceptics based on Gelbspan’s 
book. One article21 claimed,  
 
“Longtime Boston Globe editor Ross Gelbspan has been riding high since April when 
Addison-Wesley published his book The Heat is on: The high stakes battle over earth’s 
threatened climate. Gelbspan's publisher claims that oil and coal interests have been 
“paying off scientists to pose as ‘greenhouse skeptics,’ employing political lobbyists, 
proliferating propaganda materials, and distorting and suppressing the mounting 
evidence of impending climatic disaster.”  
 
While Gelbspan tried to undermine the reputation of greenhouse sceptics in the US in 1997 
by revealing financial ties to fossil fuel industries, Australian greenhouse sceptics began to 
ally themselves more with their US counterparts that same year, especially during two 
conferences. In this context the Australian press criticised Gelbspan’s stance as ‘greenhouse 
bullying’. 
 One conference, “widely criticised as a partisan showcase for greenhouse sceptics”, 
was held at Monash University in the autumn of 1997 under the title “Greenhouse ’87: 
Planning for climate change.”22 The article reporting on this conference rightly pointed out: 
“All is beautifully poised for an ‘end of millennium’ conflict which will reaffirm the cultural 
differences between science, which talks in terms of levels of uncertainty, and politics, which 
craves the illusion of certainty”. There was a sense at the end of 1997 that, as the headline of 
this article by Leigh Dalton states, “Science’s climate of doubt is over” and that the 
																																																								
21 The Australian (20/08/1997 
22 Canberra Times, 18/10/1997 
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“greenhouse showdown” had been won by the scientists rather than the sceptics.23 Moreover, 
uncertainty was acknowledged as an inherent aspect of science and, thus, the sceptics’ social 
representation that climate science is consequently faulty was challenged. It was also 
acknowledged that the “doom-gloom scenarios for which they [climate scientists] are 
pilloried could be far worse.”24  
Social representations of climate scepticism were rendered largely problematic in the 
Australian debate. However, self-alignment with US sceptics provided scope for protecting 
and enhancing the sceptic identity in a context of growing opposition. 
 
Deriving pride from the greenhouse sceptic label 
In 1997 the greenhouse sceptic label was beginning to be employed as a self-label. This was 
observable in coverage of the Countdown to Kyoto conference, which became a flashpoint for 
debate. The conference was organised by a “United States lobby group, the Frontiers of 
Freedom, and the APEC [Australian Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation] Study at Monash 
University” in August 1997.25 According to Beder (2003),26 the “conference […] was 
organised […] to ‘bolster support’ for the Government's increasingly isolated position on 
global warming in preparation for the Kyoto conference”. In a related article, US Senator 
Wallop, Chair of the conference, was labelled a “self-confessed greenhouse sceptic”.27 This 
signalled a shift towards using the label greenhouse sceptic positively as an honorific to forge 
a more assertive sceptical identity. 
The main issue of contention was the attendance at this conference of a “leading 
[U.S.] greenhouse sceptic, US congressman John Dingell.”28 An article by Ian McPhedran,29 
entitled “Ministers join Greenhouse sceptics at conference,” reported that two “senior federal 																																																								
23 Sydney Morning Herald, 24/11/1997 
24 Sydney Morning Herald, 24/11/1997 
25 Canberra Times, 18/08/1997 
26 http://www.uow.edu.au/~sharonb/STS218/greenhouse/conferences.html 
27 The Australian, 20/08/1997 
28 Australian Financial Review, 30/06/1997 
29 Canberra Times, 18/08/1997 
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ministers will share the stage with a number of strident anti-environmental movement 
advocates”. Another article30 referred to these critics as defying “greenhouse bullying” by 
mainstream scientists. In an article entitled “Counter Culture”31 Fred Pearce used the label 
‘greenhouse sceptic’ positively, portraying the sceptic Patrick Michaels, from US think tank 
the Cato Institute, “a belligerent sceptic”, as a “sceptic guru” and as being in “ebullient 
mood”. Pearce wrote that greenhouse sceptics “don’t believe in global warming. And they 
think their time has come”. 
 In these extracts, the category ‘greenhouse sceptic’ was more overtly imbued with 
positive characteristics than in media reporting in 1990 – there was, for instance, reference to 
a leading sceptic, suggesting a hierarchy within this honorific category. Sceptics were 
constructed as having ascended the hierarchy of climate change commentators through their 
association with government ministers, “senior federal ministers”. More generally, the 
increasingly positive category ‘sceptic’ was represented as a valiant one whose members 
refused to be undermined by ‘bully’ climate scientists.  
Ingroup-outgroup dynamics were reiterated, on one hand, and a positivisation of the 
climate sceptic identity, increasingly endorsed by sceptics themselves, on the other hand. The 
sceptic identity is an empowering one, as members believe that they are winning the battle for 
truth. This episode also shows that Australian policy makers were being influenced by, and 
integrated into, an emerging Australian/US greenhouse sceptical movement. 
  
2006: Australian Greenhouse sceptics and the emergence of a counter-movement  
2006 was the year of the Fourth IPCC report, the Stern report and several other reports and 
initiatives. By this point, the social representation of anthropogenic climate change was 
established as a hegemonic one, discernibly in competition with the polemic representations 
of climate sceptics. Religious metaphors again emerged this time in the framing and labelling 																																																								
30 The Australian (20/08/1997 
31 Courier Mail (20/09/1997) 
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of greenhouse sceptics. In a context where mainstream science was widely seen as winning 
the war, Rupert Murdoch, then Chairman and CEO of News Corporation, was portrayed as 
having “seen the light,”32 as having been “converted” to mainstream climate science and 
policy,33 while the then Federal Environment Minister Ian Campbell was called “a born-again 
believer in the greenhouse crisis” and Prime Minister Howard “among the last of the so-
called ‘greenhouse sceptics’ to show signs of recanting.”34  
Ian Macfarlane, then Industry Minister, a “self-described greenhouse sceptic” was 
said to have been seeing the positive side of nuclear power and Victorian State Liberal 
premier Ted Baillieu was reported to have rejected the claim that he is a ‘greenhouse 
sceptic.’35 There was even talk of a “dwindling band of greenhouse sceptics.”36 Prominent 
greenhouse sceptic and editor-in-chief of The Australian, Chris Mitchell, was now referred to 
as “one of the ‘dirty dozens’ of Australia’s ‘greenhouse sceptics.’”37 While in 1997 
greenhouse sceptics appeared to be making their mark on Australian climate politics, by 2006 
the identity ‘sceptic’ was increasingly rejected as a self-label. 
 In 2006, a discussion began about the labels used by critics of both sides in reference 
to themselves and others. Some mainstream scientists, such as geologist Chris Sharples, 
began to question the label ‘sceptic’:  
 
“I prefer not to call them sceptics because sceptics demand evidence before coming to a 
conclusion […] I call them contrarians because they ignore the evidence and just don’t 
want to know about it.”38  
 
																																																								
32 Australian Financial Review, 22/09/2006 
33 The Age, 23/10/2006; Australian Financial Review, 07/11/2006 
34 The Age, 07/10/2006 
35 The Age, 25/10/2006 
36 Canberra Times, 12/09/2006 
37 The Australian, 21/02/2006 
38 Sunday Tasmanian, 23/07/2006 
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There was contestation of the self-label ‘sceptic’ employed for self-definition among those 
who reject mainstream climate science.39 By 1997 the self-label had acquired more 
favourable connotations, but was rejected by scientists such as Sharples who wanted to 
reserve that label for mainstream scientists who, implicitly, are framed as the real ‘sceptics’. 
Sharples distinguished between scepticism about scientific evidence and ‘ignorance’ of the 
evidence and uncritical rejection, and positioned those who view themselves as sceptics 
within the latter camp, constituting a delegitimization strategy (Bar-Tal, 1990). 
There was a backlash by sceptics against a new type of labelling (as ‘deniers’). For 
instance, Christopher Pearson wrote an article entitled “Rising tide of bad science,”40 in 
which he argued against the “true believers in catastrophist science” (again drawing upon 
religious metaphors) and the “catastrophist dogma” (echoing imagery of alarmism). In 
particular, he upbraided a columnist working for The Sydney Morning Herald, who had 
written: “At least the vocal deniers are shrinking like the Wicked Witch of the West, 
drenched by a bucket of melting icecaps”, which resisted the ‘sceptic’ label and instead 
constructed those who reject the hegemonic social representation of climate change as 
pathologically deflecting truth in favour of fantasy. In response, Pearson wrote:  
 
“...Greenhouse gas sceptics, have, at the stroke of a pen, been turned into deniers, the 
moral equivalent of anti-Semites, along with David Irving and the pseudo-historians 
who say the Holocaust never happened.”  
 
The sceptic identity had, over several years, transformed from an other-label to a self-label 
imbued with positive characteristics and worthy of pride. Like Pearson, self-identified 
sceptics therefore took offence at others disputing the label. The ‘denier’ label is anchored to 
antisemitism and Holocaust denial, which serves as a legitimate rationale for rejecting it and 																																																								
39 http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2012/08/denier-alarmist-warmist-contrarian-confusionist-believer/ 
40 Weekend Australian, 10/06/2006 
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for denigrating those who attempt to attribute the label to sceptics (Bar-Tal, 1990). Yet, 
despite protests by sceptics, the label ‘climate denier’ is in the process of outperforming 
almost all other labels apart from climate sceptic (figure 1). 
Although in 2006 there was a sense that mainstream climate science might be winning 
the argument about climate change, there were also signs of an emerging countermovement, 
led by Ian Plimer “head of earth and environmental sciences at the University of Adelaide”. 
Plimer was quoted in the article just mentioned as “an eminent greenhouse sceptic with a nice 
turn of phrase who’s had plenty to say on this subject in the Independent Weekly and deserves 
a wider audience”. Here the phrase “eminent greenhouse sceptic” was presented as a positive 
label with which one could identify and be identified by others – an identity that is embraced, 
rather than resisted. As demonstrated in this article, this has been facilitated through its 
anchoring to positive phenomena and its objectification using more positive metaphors.   
 
 DISCUSSION 
 
Our study of the ‘greenhouse sceptic’ label in the Australian press over the past 25 years has 
shown that climate scientists and those critical of the scientific hegemony use the label in a 
discourse that draws heavily on religious metaphors. The label has been used primarily in an 
Australian context, though influenced by similar debates in the US. This article charts the 
emergence, development and crystallisation of the greenhouse sceptic label and demonstrates 
the label’s social, cultural and rhetorical vicissitudes in the Australia media debate. In recent 
years, the label has transformed into a social representation which evokes cultural, historical 
and social images (Moscovici, 1988). 
 
Greenhouse sceptic: Emergence of a label 
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Between 1990 and 2006 the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ for those sceptical of climate science 
and policies became prominent in Australian media. In media reporting, it has performed two 
distinct functions: (1) to label those seen to be outside the perceived consensus about climate 
change, or (2) to label those fighting this consensus and exposing its perceived flaws, 
especially in relation to uncertainty and alarmism. Through a variety of rhetorical strategies, 
including use of religious metaphors and attribution of positive traits to the sceptic label, the 
groundwork was laid for the construction of a positive sceptic identity.  
In 1990, there was an emerging struggle between the hegemonic social representation 
of anthropogenic climate change and the competing polemic representation of climate 
scepticism. Scientists and sceptics were constructed as two distinct social groups – as 
individuals who perceive a bond with like-minded others in their pursuit of a common goal 
(Johnson & Johnson, 1987) – with distinct, competing social representations organized 
primarily around truth and fallacy. There was a focus upon the themes of alarmism and 
uncertainty, which served to delegitimize climate science and to legitimize climate scepticism 
(Bar-Tal, 1990); climate scientists were delegitimized as alarmists and were equated with 
environmentalists, which put them at odds with dominant political interests. 
In the 1997 corpus, greenhouse scepticism gained momentum in the Australian press 
through two principal paths. First, the book by Gelbspan, intended to delegitimize social 
representations of climate scepticism, was in fact employed as a stimulus for asserting 
sceptical representations, and climate scientists were branded bullies. Moreover, the label 
‘greenhouse sceptic’ came to be used with pride, despite the fact that the label was used 
negatively in the book sparking this debate. 
In this coverage period, the sceptic label become one for self-definition given that for 
several years a context had been created for self-identification as a sceptic. There was a shift 
towards the use of ‘greenhouse sceptic’ as an honorific: an empowering self-label. 
‘Greenhouse sceptics’ constructed their association with government ministers as evidence of 
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having ascended the hierarchy in the climate change debate. They were now legitimate 
competitors in the climate change debate and had further pushed climate scientists - depicted 
as ‘greenhouse bullies’ - towards the periphery of this debate. In addition to becoming a label 
that differentiates ‘us’ from ‘them’, the sceptic label also acquired the potential to provide 
self-efficacy and self-esteem in a social, political and rhetorical context in which these very 
principles of identity had been challenged due, for instance, to perceived ingroup 
delegitimization (Breakwell, 1986). Articles published during this period and, particularly, 
those published in response to Gelbspan’s seminal book accentuated the divide between 
ingroup and outgroup, and illustrated a more assertive sceptical identity.  
By 2006 climate change had become a particularly important topic in the Australian 
press, and some Australian commentators adopted the sceptic label to mount a counter-
movement to mainstream science and especially Australian policies based on it. Although the 
label was no longer used so prominently in Australia, it contributed, we argue, to catalysing 
an Australian sceptical identity. The label itself contributed to the broader social 
representation of scepticism, which may no longer be viewed as a mere polemic 
representation in the Australian context but rather as having gained momentum and political 
importance. Moreover, the sceptic identity was clearly being constructed in opposition to 
climate scientists and those who accept mainstream science. The sceptic label now evoked 
imagery of defiance and distinctiveness vis-à-vis climate scientists and was increasingly 
being embraced as a self-label.  
By 2006, several political developments provided a context for greater debate and 
defence of social representations of climate change, thereby reigniting the importance of the 
sceptic label. It was Prime Minister Howard’s final year in office, amid important climate-
related world events, such as the IPCC’s publication of its latest climate report, the release of 
the Stern report in Britain and Al Gore’s film The Inconvenient Truth, combined with 
Australia experiencing its worst drought on record. Climate scientists attempted to re-
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appropriate the ‘sceptic’ label and to re-label ‘greenhouse sceptics’ as ‘contrarians’ and 
‘deniers’ in order to contest their social representations.  
 
Social representation, metaphor and policy 
The use of religious labels and metaphors in the construction of climate identities performs 
important rhetorical functions. Use of such metaphors serves to delegitimize climate science 
and to separate out ‘good’ scientists from ‘bad’ scientists, given the presence of scientists in 
the sceptics camp, but in the process it runs the risk of delegitimizing science itself (Irwin, 
1995). This is especially important in the policy sphere, where politicians and administrators 
may rely on science for making ‘good’ policy and decisions.  
The articles appear to frame science as ideology, and vested interest, concepts easily 
understood by journalists and audiences. By aligning particular sciences with particular 
political interests, delegitimization can enhance electoral success. In this battle to disseminate 
their respective social representations to the wider public and political spheres, the two social 
groups – mainstream climate scientists and climate sceptics – exploit two social 
representations: science as uncertain, unsettled and alarmist, on one hand, and science being 
based on an emerging consensus as well as caution, on the other. Sceptics employ 
conferences as tools to distribute such representations, while mainstream scientists write or 
refer to books that expose the industrial funding of such conferences and the sceptics who 
attend them. While sceptics adopt the label ‘greenhouse sceptic’ for self-definition (‘self-
confessed’) and invoke their fight against ‘greenhouse bullying’, mainstream scientists label 
them as ‘belligerent’ or ‘strident’, minimizing the threat they pose by calling them a 
‘handful’.  
On both sides of the debate, there are clear rhetorical attempts to delegitimize 
outgroups and to legitimize the ingroup, with a view to resisting the outgroup’s social 
representations and enhancing the credibility of one’s own. A principal means of doing so 
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among climate sceptics is to anchor climate science to uncertainty, politics, fraud, and greed, 
while an emerging delegitimization strategy among mainstream climate scientists constitutes 
the anchoring of scepticism to denial. Individuals require a sense of identity validation from 
others, and contestation from outgroups, in particular, can challenge the self-concept 
(Breakwell, 1986). Others’ attribution of a label with which one does not identify can induce 
threats to identity and widen the communicative gap between social groups, thereby 
accentuating intergroup conflict and polarisation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
The overarching aim of this study was to explore the use and development of the label 
‘greenhouse sceptic’ and its potential implications for social representations of climate 
change. The print media make an important contribution to social representations because, 
collectively, they constitute “a forum for the discourses of others and [are] a speaker in their 
own right” (Carvalho, 2007, p.224). They provide space for notions, images and theories to 
become popularised in the cultures and minds of individuals. The media reports analysed 
demonstrate powerfully that over time the climate sceptic identity has become a social 
representation in its own right, providing “common sense knowledge about the self” and 
indeed about others (Chryssochoou, 2003, p.227). This identity/representation imbues the self 
with esteem, distinctiveness from others and efficacy (Breakwell, 1986). Indeed, having laid 
the social foundations for a positive climate sceptic identity, sceptics protected and enhanced 
the label in media reporting and the term ‘denier’, for instance, was rejected. Yet, social 
representations (and indeed identities) are also co-constructed, contested or supported 
through other social media – political rhetoric, literature, education, everyday talk and so on. 
There is a dynamic interplay between media representation, identity and personal experience 
(Smith & Joffe, 2013). Consequently, the data presented in this article exhibit only one facet 
of the story regarding social representations of climate change and its actors but we argue that 
this is an important facet – one that can perform an agenda-setting function and introduce 
representations that are later taken up in social and political debates about climate change in 
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online and offline settings (Olausson, 2011). Future research should examine the deployment 
and development of the ‘greenhouse sceptic’ label in other forms of discourse, such as the 
first-hand accounts of sceptics themselves and those of individuals who accept the theory of 
anthropogenic climate change. 
This article shows how labels and the metaphors that surround them become social 
representations and play an important role in the climate change debate, as they separate 
actors into sides and determine the credibility with which their contributions to the debate on 
climate change ought to be viewed. Labels can be used to construct identities and to imbue 
these identities with meaning and value, but they can also inhibit debate and lead to political 
paralysis – leaving both sides at loggerheads, rather than willing to talk. 
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